Rough Justice: Inside the British Asylum System by Burgess, Harvey
Rough Justice:  
Inside the British Asylum System
Harvey Burgess
Abstract
This paper constitutes a detailed analysis and critique of 
the British asylum system from 1997 until the present day . 
It covers all the clearly defined areas of government policy, 
including funding, detention, deportation, human rights, 
European Union obligations, and asylum welfare . It also 
addresses the role of the judiciary and cites many of the 
landmark legal cases that have had a major impact on the 
sector . In providing a comprehensive overview of asylum 
and immigration that spans the entire period of the Labour 
government and the first few months of the new Coalition’s 
tenure, the author aims to show that an often illiberal UK 
asylum policy is largely governed by principles of deterrent 
and political expediency . Only an enlightened House of 
Lords, now the Supreme Court, has served as a bulwark for 
justice and mitigated the effect of draconian government 
policies .
Résumé
Cet article est une analyse détaillée et une critique du sys-
tème de l’asile britannique de 1997 à aujourd’hui . Il cou-
vre tous les domaines clairement définis de la politique 
gouvernementale, dont le financement, la détention, la 
déportation, les droits de la personne, les obligations en 
vertu de l’Union européenne et l’aide sociale offerte aux 
demandeurs d’asile . Il s’attarde aussi sur le rôle de la jus-
tice et cite des cas ayant fait jurisprudence qui ont eu d’im-
portantes répercussions . En fournissant un portrait com-
plet de la situation de l’asile et de l’immigration durant 
toute la durée du gouvernement travailliste et les premiers 
mois du mandat de la nouvelle coalition, l’auteur cherche 
à montrer que la politique restrictive en matière d’asile au 
R .-U . est largement régie par des principes de dissuasion 
et d’opportunisme politique . Seule une Chambre des lords 
éclairée et aujourd’hui la Cour suprême ont servi de rem-
part pour la justice et ont atténué les effets des politiques 
draconiennes du gouvernement .
About suffering they were never wrong,
The Old Masters: how well they understood
its human position; how it takes place while
someone else is eating or opening a window or
just walking dully along .1
Introduction
This paper constitutes a comprehensive analysis of the 
British asylum sector between 1997, the year that the Labour 
Party acceded to office after eighteen years of Conservative 
rule, and the present day. It aims to present a balanced cri-
tique of government policy from a practitioner’s perspective. 
Issues such as legal aid funding, the role of the judiciary, 
detention, deportation, human rights policy, welfare, and 
British participation in European Union immigration poli-
cies are all addressed in detail. I shall endeavour to show 
that UK asylum policy is often illiberal and largely governed 
by principles of deterrent and political expediency.
Legal Aid and the Demise of Two of the Major 
Publicly Funded Refugee Charities
On 16 June 2010, the UK’s new Conservative-Liberal Demo-
crat coalition government presided over the demise of one 
of the longest standing and most respected national refu-
gee charities. Refugee and Migrant Justice (RMJ), formerly 
the Refugee Legal Centre, which had provided free advice 
and representation for vulnerable asylum seekers since it 
was founded in 1992, went into administration.
In 2005, it was given a human rights award from the 
human rights campaigning organizations, Liberty and 
Justice and the Law Society, for “consistent and fearless 
use of the law to protect human rights and hold immigra-
tion and asylum policies up to the scrutiny of the courts.” 
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RMJ had been a shining beacon within the sector and its 
demise heralded a new low for legal aid immigration and 
asylum practitioners, as well as its 10,000 asylum-seek-
ing clients who suddenly found themselves without legal 
representation.
The RMJ was no longer able to remain solvent due to a 
change of policy introduced by the then Labour government 
which prevented it from billing its work in progress while 
cases were still ongoing. Given that cases can continue for 
several years, it has never been viable for organizations reli-
ant upon legal aid to function without staged billing. The 
Justice Secretary in the new coalition government, Ken 
Clarke, claimed that the RMJ failed to make the efficiency 
savings of other immigration providers. The RMJ rejected 
that allegation, arguing that it worked a minor miracle by 
continuing to operate for years in the face of swinging cuts 
in its budget, particularly the replacement of hourly rates by 
the fixed fee system.
On 11 July 2011, the Immigration Advisory Service (IAS), 
the largest provider of publicly funded asylum and immi-
gration legal advice and representation, went into adminis-
tration. The IAS had been in existence for thirty-five years 
and employed 300 people. It routinely handled over 20,000 
cases a year. The government’s decision to remove immigra-
tion from the scope of legal aid and also to reduce the legal 
aid fees for refugees seeking asylum in the UK by 10 per 
cent, resulted in the IAS losing 60 per cent of its income.
The Legal Services Commission (LSC), which had raised 
concerns over the IAS’s financial management, stated that 
the decision taken by the IAS to go into administration was 
“theirs alone.”
Practitioners would adduce the sad end of both the RMJ 
and the IAS as evidence that the government is seeking both 
to undermine immigration and asylum practitioners and to 
restrict access to justice for their clients.
The LSC, formerly the Legal Aid Board, is the agency 
mandated to administer legal aid, a system predicated upon 
access to justice for the unemployed and lowest income seg-
ments of society. In the early years of the New Labour per-
iod, the LSC encouraged dynamic small and medium sized 
immigration firms to expand, but it signally failed to fol-
low through on its commitment to good quality immigra-
tion and asylum representation. Instead, increasingly lent 
on by government, it set about cutting costs and increas-
ing bureaucracy with gusto. One by one, respected, long-
standing legal aid immigration lawyers either were forced 
out of business altogether or decided to move into the pri-
vate sector.
Multi-million pound “super” contracts were negotiated 
with a handful of large firms, the vast majority of which 
were known within the sector to be disreputable. Prime 
Minister Blair and a succession of hard-line home secretar-
ies, notably David Blunkett and Jack Straw, launched sting-
ing attacks on human rights lawyers, whom they alleged 
were cynically milking the system by stringing out cases 
and bringing frivolous appeals. Many practitioners were of 
the opinion that New Labour did not want to be inconven-
ienced by conscientious asylum lawyers who were not pre-
pared to allow poor decision making to go unchallenged. Its 
ultimate aim appeared to be a pared down, American-style 
system of public defenders.
For at least half a decade under New Labour, the Home 
Office became a nightmare to deal with. It was supposed 
to be undergoing a complete overhaul, to include a new 
computer system costing an estimated 80 million pounds, 
which was eventually scrapped in 2001. Hundreds of files 
were lost and getting through on the telephone was virtually 
impossible. With the exception of minors, Legal Aid for rep-
resentatives to attend their clients’ asylum interviews was 
discontinued.
New Labour’s Asylum Policy
In 1998, a year after Labour came into office, they tagged 
their new policy on immigration and asylum “Fairer, Faster 
and Firmer.” The “Fairer” element of the package consisted 
of warm words as to the contribution made by immigrants 
to British society, an amnesty for 10,000 asylum seekers 
who had been waiting for a decision since 1993 (a back-
log of 50,000 undecided applications had accrued), and the 
right of detainees to have automatic bail hearings. However, 
it soon became clear that government policy would be 
largely influenced by the Europe-wide push to harmon-
ize asylum and immigration policy. Governments across 
Europe appeared to be at one in their desire to cut costs 
and ramp up controls.
The following measures all appeared in the government’s 
1999 asylum and immigration law: increased powers of 
enforcement and detention (including the continued deten-
tion of torture victims and children); the expansion of “fast-
track” appeals and a reduction in appeal rights, not least the 
right to appeal against deportation and to pursue Judicial 
Review actions in cases where a person faced removal on 
safe third country grounds; the termination of all welfare 
benefits to asylum seekers; and a new system of dispersal 
under which asylum seekers would be given no say as to 
where in the country they were sent. The offer of housing 
was to be made on a “take it or leave it” basis.
The pressing issue of the poor quality of initial decision 
making, a corollary of the culture of disbelief which perme-
ated the whole system, was not addressed. The UK Home 
Office has long been infamous for its “cut and paste” refusal 
letters and the fact that it routinely refuses 95 per cent of 
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applications. Historically, some 25 per cent of applicants 
have been successful in overturning those decisions in the 
immigration courts.
Judicial Review applications were knocked back by 
High Court judges with ever increasing regularity and 
Immigration judges showed no compunction in rubbish-
ing expert reports and either ignoring or quoting selectively 
from human rights reports.
In October 2000, the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) was enshrined into British law by way of the 
Human Rights Act (HRA), a development that received a 
widespread welcome. The aim was to protect the individual 
from public authorities that violated Convention rights and 
to bring human rights issues within domestic jurisdiction. 
In order to dampen down any premature optimism that 
New Labour intended to be a pioneer in the cause of human 
rights, the Home Office minister, Mike O’Brien, immedi-
ately declared that the legislation should be viewed as “a 
shield, not a sword for rights… .”2
As far as asylum was concerned, the advent of the HRA 
impacted most of all on Articles 3—the right not to be sub-
jected to inhuman and degrading treatment—and 8—the 
right to a private and family life—of the ECHR. Applicants 
had previously had to rely on Home Office discretionary 
policies which did not generate appeal rights so the for-
malization of such rights was unreservedly beneficial. The 
HRA provided a valuable benchmark as to the interpreta-
tion of humanitarian law. Minds were certainly focused 
and the ECHR dovetailed nicely with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.
Post 9/11 Backlash: Deportation
Within a year, 9/11 happened and the entire climate sur-
rounding human rights was transformed. In the ensu-
ing years, unprecedented anti-terrorism legislation was 
introduced. A new court entitled the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC) was set up to deal with the 
appeals of those facing deportation in relation to issues of 
terrorism and national security. Secret evidence was to be 
permitted and appellants could only be represented by spe-
cial advocates who had to be vetted by the security servi-
ces. Furthermore, punitive “control orders” (which involve 
electronically tagging the persons in question and placing a 
whole array of restrictions on who they can meet or speak 
to, where they can and cannot go or work, and what tech-
nology they can use) were introduced and the legal period 
of detention without charge was extended from forty-eight 
hours at the beginning of the decade to forty-two days 
by 2008. Predictably, the immigration and asylum sector 
felt the backlash, not least at the hands of a biased British 
press. Attacks on asylum seekers in the tabloids multiplied. 
Emboldened by government policy and rhetoric, there was 
no limit to their vindictiveness and mendacity. Richard 
Desmond took the lead when he pledged to run a sustained 
campaign against asylum seekers in his newspaper, the Daily 
Express. During a single thirty-one day period in 2003, he 
ran twenty-two negative front-page stories on asylum seek-
ers. Characterized by racism, homophobia, and xenophobia, 
the tabloids never passed up an opportunity to label asylum 
seekers as terrorists, criminals, and rapists. They were all 
illegal, bogus, and disease ridden as well as being respon-
sible for the spread of HIV-AIDS in the UK, plotting to kill 
Tony Blair, and eating swans and donkeys!
The 2006 foreign prisoner scandal was the catalyst 
for a push by the government to deport foreign nationals 
en masse. For in April 2006 it came to light that over one 
thousand foreign prisoners had been freed even though 
the authorities had failed to consider whether or not they 
should face deportation proceedings. The Home Secretary 
admitted that he did not know where they all were and, 
given that some of them were drug dealers and sex offenders, 
the inevitable storm in the tabloid press followed. Equally 
predictably, the government tried to rectify its error by 
being as tough as possible. It introduced a new policy predi-
cated upon a presumption that foreign prisoners would be 
deported at the end of their sentences and it also introduced 
plans for a compulsory biometric identification for all for-
eign nationals.
Historically, the immigration rules had provided for 
deportation action to be initiated if the crime committed 
carried a two-year custodial sentence. This was halved to 
one year in 2007. The Home Office began trawling through 
their records to find any foreign nationals with criminal rec-
ords, regardless of how long ago the offence took place or 
how minor it may have been. Many hundreds of deportation 
orders were issued and families suffered as their loved ones 
were detained and informed that they were to be expelled 
(the case of Jimmy Mubenga, see below, illustrates how 
human rights law cannot always act as a safeguard for indi-
viduals who appear, prima facie, to have very strong cases).
The government then went even further in legislating 
to replace the presumption in favour of deportation with 
automatic deportation. As of August 2008, deportation was 
deemed unequivocally to be conducive to the public good. 
One example of the highly political nature of the issue is 
evidenced by the fact that there is a lay member alongside 
two judges at deportation hearings and he or she will often 
be interventionist in putting forward public opinion.
Detention Policy
The UK policy on detention of asylum seekers has long been 
controversial. In 1994, Amnesty International found that 
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it breached international human rights standards, due to 
the fact that detainees were not being properly informed of 
the reasons for their detention, that there was no automatic 
scrutiny by a court of the decision to detain, and that they 
were often held in prisons alongside convicted prisoners.
The Home Office argues that it detains asylum seekers 
only as a last resort and only if it is thought that the risk 
of their absconding is high. The reality is that many of the 
one thousand or so asylum seekers who are locked up at 
any one time are detained upon arrival (often for the first 
time in their lives), and the statistics show that less than 4 
per cent of those granted temporary admission into the UK 
abscond.
Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states that refu-
gees should not be penalized for entering a country illegally. 
And yet, the UK has persisted in criminalizing those who 
enter the country with no documents or false documents or 
who are found to have destroyed their travel documents on 
the advice of their agent or smuggler. It is entirely arbitrary 
whom the Home Office decides to charge. There are around 
5 per cent of new arrivals who are unlucky enough to be 
singled out and their sentences are usually 6 months or so. 
Even if the term does not reach the twelve-month threshold 
judges periodically recommend deportation.
Throughout the last two decades, there have been periodic 
disturbances at immigration detention centres, including 
hunger strikes and suicides. Campsfield House, an institu-
tion situated in the Oxfordshire countryside, which is run 
by Group 4 Security, was once referred to in the Financial 
Times as “part Franz Kafka, part George Orwell.”3 It was 
the scene of two serious incidents, in 1994 and 1997, during 
which protests turned violent and had to be suppressed by 
riot police. Detainees complained of a lack of medical care, 
a loud and intrusive public address system, surveillance 
cameras everywhere, mail tampering, being transferred to 
prisons without their lawyers being informed, poor food, 
and inadequate recreational facilities.
Yarl’s Wood immigration detention centre in Bedford-
shire, a major removal centre for women and families, has 
had a history of unrest since it opened in 2001. It was dev-
astated by fire in 2002 following a riot; in 2004, a report 
by the Prisons and Probations Ombudsman exposed staff 
racism and violence; in 2009, it was revealed that chil-
dren were being denied urgent medical treatment; and in 
February 2010, an investigation was launched by Members 
of Parliament following allegations that women detainees 
were badly beaten up by employees of Serco, the private 
security firm which runs the centre, during an ongoing 
hunger strike.
Over the last fifteen years, I personally have sat opposite 
at least twenty clients in detention who have complained 
that they have been both physically and verbally abused by 
immigration officers or private security staff. Those who 
have been the subject of forced removal attempts have been 
particularly prone to violent treatment. My clients have 
described being restrained and beaten by as many as ten 
officials as they were bundled onto commercial airliners 
whilst they fought tooth and nail to resist removal.
As I write this, the story of the death of Jimmy Mubenga, 
a forty-six-year-old Angolan, on a British Airways plane 
stationed on the runway at Heathrow Airport, is front-page 
news. He was allegedly restrained by three security guards 
who handcuffed him and used excessive force. They were 
pressing down on him for at least forty-five minutes. One 
passenger across the aisle is quoted as saying that Mubenga 
complained of not being able to breathe for at least ten min-
utes before he lost consciousness and another has said that 
he was screaming at the back of the plane and repeatedly 
saying: “They’re going to kill me.”4 And that is exactly what 
they did. Mubenga never regained consciousness. He was 
taken to hospital and pronounced dead. The three security 
guards, who work for G4S, formerly referred to as Group 4 
Security, were arrested but released on bail without being 
charged. Scotland Yard has said that the death is being 
treated as “unexplained.”
A leaked G4S document has revealed that their staff are 
employing control and restraint techniques that the govern-
ment’s own advice warns can cause skull fractures, blind-
ness, and asphyxia.5 Deportee escort has become a lucrative 
business for private security firms. G4S is estimated to have 
been paid more than 9 million pounds between May 2005 
and November 2006 for this alone.6
Mubenga had been living in the UK for sixteen years. 
Originally an asylum seeker, he was initially granted 
Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR), a limited but renew-
able status which leads to Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). 
He was a devoted family man with a wife and five children—
two of whom were born in the UK—between the ages of 
sixteen years and seven months. In 2006, following a night-
club brawl, he was convicted of actual bodily harm and sen-
tenced to two years in prison. The Home Office duly sought 
to deport him. He fought the case tooth and nail. His lawyer 
tells me that they were knocked back several times, both in 
the domestic courts and in the European Court which did 
not consider his case to be exceptional enough. By that time, 
Mubenga had ILR in the UK and the rest of his family, who 
had ELR, had applied for ILR at the end of their allotted 
period of ELR. For four years the Home Office apparently 
neglected to deal with their case, which ought to have been 
an academic exercise in granting them Leave in Line. The 
lawyer believes their motivation was clearly to weaken the 
Article 8 claim as it would have been harder to argue that 
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the family could relocate to Angola if they were all settled 
in the UK.
Immigration enforcement officers invariably turn up 
en masse at their target’s abode, at dawn on a weekend 
morning, knowing full well that the person’s lawyer will 
usually not be working at that time. The experience of 
my Cameroonian client, Georges, is fairly typical. On his 
behalf, we had lodged an application for Judicial Review at 
the High Court. Whilst we were awaiting a response, his 
house was raided by at least eight armed immigration offi-
cers at 5.30 a.m. on a Sunday morning. Georges was held in 
a cell at Waterloo Station for twenty-four hours before being 
released. As so often happens, there had been a breakdown 
of communication either between government lawyers and 
the Immigration Service or between the senior immigra-
tion officers and their enforcement team, who were unaware 
that legal proceedings were pending and that Georges was 
not therefore removable from the UK. It was a clear case 
of unlawful detention and we referred the case to a lawyer 
specializing in that field. It took a long time but Georges was 
eventually compensated to the tune of 3,000 pounds. There 
are many instances of both unlawful detention and unlaw-
ful removal from the UK. (The Home Office periodically 
agrees to bring back erroneously returned individuals. In 
August 2010, it paid out 100,000 pounds in damages to a gay 
asylum seeker who was deported to his native Uganda where 
he was burned and hung upside down in prison.) Georges 
could easily have been put on a train to France, from where 
he had originally arrived, or even a plane to Cameroon, on 
that Sunday.
Right at the start of its tenure, in the summer of 2010, the 
coalition government pledged to end the detention of immi-
grant children, an unreservedly positive development. And 
yet, there are now fears that it is going to water down this 
commitment by setting up new centres to detain families 
who refuse to leave the country.
Expanding the number of failed asylum seekers who 
are detained is seen by governments of all persuasions as 
a useful tool for increasing the number of removals. The 
alleged failure of successive governments to remove enough 
failed asylum seekers has long been a hotly debated issue. 
New Labour was continually criticized by the Tories for 
having a poor record in that regard. It set itself a target of 
30,000 removals a year but failed to get close to that figure, 
although, in 2006, it managed over 18,000.
Detention also impacts negatively on the ability of law-
yers to represent their clients effectively, principally due 
to the strict deadlines for the preparation of cases. For 
example, in 2003, a fast-track system was introduced at 
Harmondsworth Immigration Removals Centre, close to 
Heathrow Airport (it was subsequently expanded to other 
centres). Single, male asylum seekers, whose cases, the 
authorities deemed, could be determined quickly were to be 
detained upon arrival and remain incarcerated throughout 
the procedure, until they were either removed or allowed to 
remain in the UK. The timescales were iniquitous. Asylum 
interviews took place on the day after arrival in the deten-
tion centre, decisions the following day, and appeals within 
a week of the refusal.
A 2006 report undertaken by Bail For Immigration 
Detainees (BID), showed that 99 per cent of the applica-
tions were refused and less than 3 per cent of appeals were 
successful. In 60 per cent of the cases reviewed by BID the 
Appellant had no legal representative in court whilst the 
Home Office was represented. There was a consensus that 
the system was set up to refuse applications as there was not 
enough time for detainees’ cases to be prepared, nor was 
there enough time for bail applications to be made. In my 
experience, it is logistically impossible to assemble all the 
documents required, whether they are the client’s personal 
documents, or press and human rights reports, or expert 
reports, in particular medico-legal reports, and also to have 
them translated into English where appropriate, within 
seven days.
The system of bail in the UK is signally lacking in settled 
procedures and structure. There are no practice directions 
(notes made by judges as to how specific procedures or for-
malities should be carried out) on bail nor are there any 
higher court judgments due to the fact that appeals are rou-
tinely predicated on the principle of habeas corpus (the right 
of every prisoner to challenge the terms of his or her incar-
ceration in court before a judge) rather than on the specifics 
of a decision or procedural irregularities. Bail summaries, 
along with Entry Clearance refusal letters, have a reputation 
amongst lawyers as being particularly poorly reasoned.
Human Rights: Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR
The House of Lords in the landmark case of Razgar7 set 
down the questions that need to be addressed when deter-
mining an Article 8 claim. The decision maker must con-
sider whether removal interferes with private or family life; 
if so, does the interference reach the Article 8 threshold? If 
so, is it in accordance with the law? If so, is it necessary in 
the interests of national security, public safety, economic 
well-being, health, and morals? And if so, is it proportionate 
to the legitimate, desired public end? These are the criteria 
which underpin the so-called proportionality principle.
When the HRA was introduced, a very conservative 
Immigration Tribunal (the upper tier in the immigration 
courts) appeared, together with the Court of Appeal, to 
close ranks in an attempt to mitigate its potentially radical 
impact. Alongside them stood the House of Lords, not yet 
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the corrective it would become later in the decade. Vis-à-
vis Article 8, the courts’ position was that a case had to be 
exceptional for it to succeed. Furthermore, the Immigration 
Tribunal was considered to be the principal fact finder 
and the higher courts would only interfere if a decision 
was seen to be perverse and/or fell without an acceptable 
margin of discretion. In 2000, the Court of Appeal, in the 
case of Mahmood,8 heavily influenced by the European 
Court of Human Rights, set down guidelines as to the 
correct approach to be taken by decision makers seeking 
to strike a fair balance between the claims of family life 
against the need to uphold the integrity of immigration 
control. Essentially, removal of one family member from 
a State where other family members were lawfully resident 
would not infringe Article 8 provided that there were no 
insurmountable obstacles to the family living together in 
the Appellant’s country of origin, even where they would 
experience a degree of hardship.
The Court placed much emphasis on the negative aspects 
of Article 8 cases, such as the inherent weakness of an Article 
8 application where enforcement action predated a marriage 
and the parties entered into the marriage fully aware of the 
Appellant’s tenuous immigration status. Moreover, it was 
solely the impact on the Appellant’s human rights and not 
those of the family that the Court was obligated to consider.
By 2007 though, the prevailing wind had at last turned 
in favour of the individual. The House of Lords was in a 
liberal phase and set down a series of landmark Article 8 
cases, most notably in the cases of Huang,9 Beoku-Betts,10 
and Chikwamba.11
In Huang, the exceptionality test was dispensed with, 
as was the margin of discretion—or appreciation—prin-
ciple. The Court found that it was incumbent upon the 
Tribunal to determine whether an immigration decision 
was incompatible with the Human Rights Convention 
and therefore unlawful. Simply reviewing the decision of 
the primary decision maker would not suffice. The Court 
emphasized “the core value” which Article 8 exists to pro-
tect, namely, the family. It went on to articulate all of the 
factors that were important in determining the strength of 
a family unit, such as financial and emotional dependence, 
cultural traditions, and its closeness and previous history.
In overturning the Court of Appeal decision in Beoku-
Betts, the Lords found that the correct approach in Article 8 
cases was to have regard to the family unit as a whole and to 
the impact of removal of the Appellant upon each and every 
one of the family members. This constituted an important 
departure from previous precedent that had focused almost 
exclusively on the Appellant. Baroness Hale of Richmond 
summarized the Court’s approach, as follows:
To insist that an appeal to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal 
consider only the effect upon other family members as it affects 
the appellant, and that a judicial review brought by other family 
members considers only the effect upon the appellant as it affects 
them, is not only artificial and impracticable. It also risks mis-
sing the central point about family life, which is that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its individual parts. The right to respect 
for the family life of one necessarily encompasses the right to 
respect for the family life of others, normally a spouse or minor 
children, with whom that family life is enjoyed.
In Chikwamba, the thorny issue of Home Office delay in 
dealing with cases was addressed. The Lords held that delay 
in the decision-making process could result in an applicant 
developing closer personal and social ties and deeper roots 
in the host community, thereby strengthening an Article 8 
claim. Moreover, the longer the passage of time without a 
decision, the less force the proportionality argument that a 
relationship, however genuine, is trumped by immigration 
irregularities, will have. Finally, the more dysfunctional, 
inconsistent, and unfair the system as a whole is shown to 
be, the more the weight of the integrity of immigration con-
trol argument is reduced.
For the first time, the Home Office was to be held to 
account on the delay issue. Whilst it would not eliminate 
the entrenched problem of the limbo status of thousands of 
asylum seekers, the hope was that it would at least exercise 
government minds and start to make some inroads.
The private life plank of Article 8 has proved to be much 
more intractable. Interference with a person’s “physical 
or moral integrity,” as the courts have termed it, has been 
very hard to prove. However, in Razgar, the House of 
Lords accepted the proposition that the detrimental effect 
of removal on a person’s mental health might well engage 
Article 8. The Court held that the Appellant, an Iraqi Kurd, 
had a right to a substantive human rights appeal on the 
basis of his human rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
The Appellant faced removal to Germany where his asy-
lum claim had been refused and where he alleged he had 
been subjected to racist abuse. The Home Office maintained 
that the Appellant’s human rights claim was manifestly 
unfounded but the Lords found that due to the adverse 
state of his mental health, his rights under Article 8 could 
be engaged even if his removal did not violate Article 3. 
The Appellant had previously attempted suicide and been 
diagnosed as suffering with depression and post-traumatic 
stress disorder. He was on medication and undergoing 
psychiatric therapy in the UK. He argued that he would 
be deprived of the equivalent treatment in Germany. The 
Court concurred with the findings of the European Court 
in Bensaid12 that the Appellant’s mental health “must also 
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be regarded as a crucial part of private life associated with 
the aspect of moral integrity … The preservation of mental 
stability is in that context an indispensible precondition to 
effective enjoyment of the right to respect for private life.”
As regards Article 3 of the ECHR, two major factors 
have ensured that the advent of the HRA has not acted as a 
catalyst for the courts’ interpretation of it to develop in the 
broad manner that has taken place with Article 8.
Firstly, there is the fact that Article 3 of the ECHR is an 
unqualified right and can never be subjected to the kind of 
balancing act that occurs in the case of the Article 8 pro-
portionality test. No exception or derogation from Article 
3 is possible, even in circumstances where a public emer-
gency threatens the life of the nation. And secondly, the pre-
dominance of health cases within the ambit of Article 3 has 
consistently politicized it and, de facto, rendered it a “flood-
gates” issue. In other words, the powers that be have been 
exceptionally wary of setting a favourable precedent that 
could lead to a multitude of successful claims by so-called 
health tourists or others suffering from life-threatening ill-
nesses. Whereas in Article 8 claims, the presumption is that 
Applicants may well end up contributing to British society, 
with Article 3, it is believed they will only ever be a burden.
The issue of HIV-AIDS is the defining one as far as Article 
3 is concerned. Ironically, prior to the HRA, the Home Office 
policy on HIV was more liberal than the decisions eman-
ating from Strasbourg. The 2007 decision of the European 
Court in D13 set down firm principles which would make it 
almost impossible for someone to win an Article 3 case on 
health grounds. It was held that the expelling state is not 
obligated to provide medical care indefinitely to those who 
would be unable to access an equivalent level of treatment 
in their own country. Even if the returnee’s life expectancy 
was to be significantly reduced, barring very exceptional 
circumstances, it would not be enough to breach Article 3. 
D only won his case because he was very close to dying of 
AIDS and had no possibility of medical treatment or family 
support in his country of origin, St. Kitts.
In another landmark case, namely that of N,14 the 
Appellant argued that his AIDS-related illness was being 
controlled by the combination therapy (anti-retroviral 
drugs) he was receiving in the UK and that, were he to be 
returned to Uganda, the limited nature of the treatment 
and drugs available there would result in his rapid and fatal 
deterioration. Combination therapy is very tricky to admin-
ister and cannot easily be varied in the way that antibiotics 
can. The House of Lords rejected his case and the European 
Court did likewise.
Until recently, almost exclusively the only cases which 
deal with the core asylum issues have been successful in 
terms of Article 3. Interestingly though, there have been 
signs of a judicial thaw emanating from the impenetrable 
brick wall of D and N. In the case of JA,15 the Court of 
Appeal found in favour of an HIV-positive Appellant from 
the Ivory Coast who had been diagnosed after arriving in 
the UK and was receiving anti-retroviral drugs from the 
National Health Service (NHS). Her case was distinguish-
able from D and N on account of the fact that she had entered 
the country lawfully, had been granted Leave to Remain on 
the basis of her medical condition (renewal of that Leave 
was refused after Home Office policy changed), and had 
been lawfully resident in the UK for some nine years. She 
did not therefore need to demonstrate exceptional circum-
stances. However, it ought to be stressed that the Court of 
Appeal only allowed the appeal to the extent that it remitted 
it back to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal to be heard 
anew.
The real thorn in the side of the Home Office is the ques-
tion of alleged terrorists who cannot be excluded in breach of 
Article 3. Much to its chagrin, the government has consist-
ently been thwarted by the judiciary on a whole raft of so-
called national security cases. Of course, this is the principal 
area in which opponents of the HRA dismiss it as being a 
liberal tool which protects criminals and terrorists.
It was, arguably, inevitable that there would be a pro-
tracted period of percolation whilst the judiciary weighed up 
the potentially huge ramifications of the HRA. Eventually, 
the highest court in the land began to lead from the front 
and adopt a more expansive position. Meanwhile, the Court 
of Appeal, still displaying its trademark conservatism and, 
notwithstanding the odd enlightened decision, as in the 
case of JA mentioned above, stubbornly refuses to soften its 
stance.
In the case of TM, KM and LZ,16 three Zimbabweans, the 
Court of Appeal placed negligible weight upon low-level sur-
place activity (a person becomes a “refugee sur-place” either 
as a result of circumstances arising in his country during 
his absence or due to his own actions, such as expressing his 
political views in the country where he has sought refuge). 
Furthermore, it called into question whether the principles 
set down by the Supreme Court (see below) in HJ and HT,17 
that gays should not be expected to lie about their sexuality 
upon return to their home country, could properly be trans-
posed onto the issue of an Appellant’s political opinion. 
Whilst the principle enunciated in HJ and HT does theor-
etically apply to all Convention grounds, Elias J. expressed 
doubt that it would be as far-reaching as the Zimbabwean 
Appellants had sought to argue. The matter would need to 
be explored at a later date but it would likely revolve around 
whether the proposed action giving rise to persecution was 
at the core of a human right or at its margins.
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Asylum Welfare
The issue of the welfare of asylum seekers and the denial of 
their right to work has been always been a vexatious one. 
Successive governments have been guided by the principle 
of deterrent, believing that asylum seekers come to the UK 
because they see it as a soft touch, especially in respect of 
welfare provision. The Labour government steadily ratch-
eted up the restrictions that were already in place under 
the previous regime. Whereas the Tories had denied bene-
fits to asylum seekers who failed to apply for asylum at the 
port of entry and all those whose applications were refused, 
Labour went further in withdrawing them from all asylum 
seekers. With regard to their right to work, the Tory policy 
had been to allow asylum seekers to apply for a work per-
mit six months after lodging their application if no decision 
had been made (this was automatically withdrawn if they 
were refused). In 2002, Labour introduced a blanket ban 
on their right to work, although this was softened a little in 
2005, when it was decided that they could work if they had 
been waiting twelve months for a decision on their claim. In 
2010, the Supreme Court held that the twelve-month rule 
also applied to refused asylum seekers who lodged a “fresh 
claim.”18
Tory legislation denying benefits to certain categor-
ies of asylum seekers was challenged successfully in the 
courts. In 1996, the High Court found that Section 21 of 
the 1948 National Assistance Act, originally designed to 
provide residential accommodation to those in need of care 
and attention, could also apply to destitute asylum seekers 
who needed Local Authorities to care for them to prevent 
them from literally starving to death.19 In response, Local 
Authorities in London began to disperse asylum seekers to 
other parts of the country. Labour embraced dispersal and 
formalized it in its Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The 
nightmare scenarios for both central and local government 
were avoided. For the former, the spectacle of thousands of 
asylum seekers on the streets of London was avoided, and 
for the latter, the lack of geographical restrictions averted a 
potentially serious accommodation crisis in the capital.
Nonetheless, dispersal caused a great amount of hard-
ship and hurt. Families and communities were split up as 
thousands of asylum seekers were shipped off to run-down 
sink estates in cities and far-flung corners of rural England 
where many of the inhabitants had never come into contact 
with black or ethnic minority people. The government failed 
to consult and make adequate provision for local author-
ities to cope with the increased strain on services. Inevitably, 
this caused a great deal of resentment and social division.
The National Asylum Support Service (NASS) was the 
body charged with administering the system and major 
asylum charities, such as the Refugee Council, happily 
collaborated with it. A lot of money was made as uninhabit-
able buildings were shoddily spruced up to accommodate 
asylum seekers, not least by disreputable landlords who did 
deals with NASS at excessive rents. Lawyers brought cases 
to try and keep their vulnerable clients (particularly those 
who had been dispersed but then fled back to London after 
being racially abused in the dispersal area) in London where 
their community and support networks were. Most challen-
ges were rejected by the courts. The Court of Appeal tin-
kered with the Section 21 judgment but essentially came to 
the same conclusion.
The 1999 Act also introduced a controversial system of 
food vouchers for asylum seekers. Not only was the amount 
less than the level of income support, it was also limited to 
certain supermarkets and did not allow for any change in 
the form of cash in the event that the items purchased were 
less than the value of the voucher. Asylum seekers were duly 
humiliated as they were often forced to walk miles to the 
designated supermarket and were clearly identifiable as they 
produced their vouchers at the checkout. The system was 
scrapped in 2002.
The Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 
was introduced by the Labour government. Section 55 of 
that act denied asylum seekers any means of support from 
the government unless they had claimed asylum “as soon 
as was reasonably practicable” after arriving in the country. 
Despite the government claiming, during the passage of the 
bill, that Section 55 would only target people who had been 
in the country for some time and who claimed asylum at the 
last minute to avoid removal, in practice as many as 90 per 
cent of asylum seekers fell foul of this provision. The inevit-
able legal challenge to the government in 2003 was success-
ful. The High Court ruled, in the case of Q and others, that 
the way it was operating the policy, effectively rendering the 
vast majority of asylum seekers totally destitute, breached 
the UK’s obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR.20
The Secretary of State appealed the decision in Q and, 
although the Court of Appeal upheld the Administrative 
Court’s findings on Article 3, it watered them down some-
what in holding that Applicants needed to show that they 
had made serious efforts to find accommodation.
In the 2005 case of Limbuela, the House of Lords set 
down further guidance on the issue of Article 3 and destitu-
tion. It upheld the Court of Appeal’s findings in Q as regards 
the Article 3 breach but, in view of the scarcity of accom-
modation, held that there was no requirement for asylum 
seekers to demonstrate that they had looked for it.21
In 2008, the House of Lords ruled that the High Court 
judgment in M was wrong and that being able-bodied but 
destitute was not enough to qualify for Local Authority care 
under Section 21 of the National Assistance Act.22
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In 2009, the issue of unaccompanied child asylum seek-
ers, known as unaccompanied minors, was litigated. Where 
such minors present themselves to a Local Authority with 
no accommodation, they will necessarily be accommodated 
under Section 20 of the Children Act 1989 until they are 
eighteen, when the Local Authority will continue to support 
them under what are known as the Leaving Care provisions 
of the Children Act. The responsibility to support minors, 
often until they reach twenty-four, is an onerous and costly 
one, which is why Local Authorities routinely would claim 
to have supported child asylum seekers under an alterna-
tive provision of the Children Act (Section 17) so as to avoid 
the need to help them once they turned eighteen. Whilst 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, in a 
major test case, a challenge to the way Local Authorities 
avoided their Leaving Care responsibilities, the House of 
Lords allowed an appeal, deciding in a ground-breaking 
judgment that virtually all minors accommodated by Local 
Authorities were deemed to have been housed under Section 
20 of the Children Act.23
In another ground-breaking judgment involving unaccom-
panied minors, the Supreme Court ruled (again overturning 
the Court of Appeal) that the contentious issue of unaccom-
panied minors’ true ages—they were, and still are, often 
accused of mendacity when claiming to be under eighteen—
should be decided ultimately by the courts on the balance of 
probabilities rather than by way of a conventional Judicial 
Review challenge requiring the claimant to show that the 
Local Authority had acted perversely, a much harder hurdle 
to overcome.24
The Supreme Court
The new Supreme Court replaced the House of Lords in 
October 2009. Its introduction was essentially a matter of 
propriety, as it was designed to bring increased clarity and 
modernity to the separation of powers between the legisla-
ture and the judiciary. It has continued to set down liberal 
judgments. One example from 2010 dealt with the issue of 
homosexuals. The Supreme Court overturned a Court of 
Appeal judgment in the case of HJ and HT in which it was 
held that homosexuals could reasonably be expected to con-
ceal their sexuality in their home country, in order to avoid 
persecution. It gave short shrift to this argument when it 
declared that compelling a gay person to pretend that his 
sexuality does not exist is to deny him the right to be who 
he is.
The Safe Third Country Principle
The return of asylum seekers to so-called safe third countries, 
such as the US, Canada, Switzerland, or European Union 
(EU) member States, has been troublesome to administer 
and often unjust. The Dublin Convention of 1997, part of the 
EU harmonization program, introduced the principle that 
individuals must make their asylum application in the first 
EU country they enter. They can be returned to another EU 
member State if it is found that they either passed through 
that State or lodged a claim there. One of the motivations 
behind the Convention was to put an end to what has been 
called “asylum shopping,” the idea that asylum seekers will-
fully decide where they will claim asylum depending on the 
level of welfare benefits and reception conditions.
As well as creating another level of bureaucracy, being a 
drain on resources, and preventing the reunification of fam-
ilies, the Convention has resulted in asylum seekers being 
returned to countries which accept them under sufferance 
and who, particularly in the cases of Greece and Italy, do 
not provide them with treatment befitting so-called mature 
democracies that are signatories to the Geneva Convention. 
Indeed, in 2008, sixty-three refugee-assisting organizations 
urged all EU countries to cease removals to Greece under 
the Dublin Convention (Norway and Finland both did so) 
and an open letter to EU governments from the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) referred to the 
lack of a fair determination procedure in Greece and risk 
of serious human rights violations there. The Greek policy 
of detaining asylum seekers in metal containers caused out-
rage in 2005 as did the 2003 Italian policy of shooting at 
boats carrying illegal immigrants.
The fact is that significant differences still exist in the asy-
lum policies of member States and, throughout the period of 
the Dublin Convention, there have been grave concerns that 
asylum seekers returned from the UK to other EU countries 
might then be expelled back to the country of origin where 
a real risk of persecution exists. Consequently, many hun-
dreds of third-country cases have been heard both by the 
UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights.
In 1999, in the landmark case of Dahmas,25 the Court 
of Appeal ruled that Denmark was not a safe country for 
the Appellant, an Algerian political activist, to be sent back 
to. He had already had his asylum claim rejected by the 
Danish authorities and faced the prospect of being sum-
marily removed back to Algeria. The judgment articulated 
two vitally important principles: firstly, that whilst in gen-
eral it is not within the remit of the UK to second-guess or 
to scrutinize the decisions of other European tribunals, in 
cases where the facts are so startling, and where the decision 
of another has been so perverse and manifestly irrational, 
it is incumbent upon the courts to quash it; and secondly, 
that in cases where there is every likelihood that someone 
will be returned to a country where they will face persecu-
tion in the form of detention and torture, decision makers 
must have ultimate recourse to the 1951 Convention and its 
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obligations with regard thereto; i.e. the protection principle 
is paramount.
Notwithstanding Dahmas, it has been immensely dif-
ficult to stem the tide of third country removals. In 2008, 
the European Court upheld a decision of the Court of 
Appeal in the case of KRS26 that the Appellant, an Iranian 
national, could be returned from the UK to Greece and, in 
the case of Nasseri27 in 2009, the House of Lords concurred 
with the Court of Appeal that the Appellant, an Afghan 
national, could also be returned from the UK to Greece. 
Both Appellants had been refused asylum in Greece and 
argued that they would be refouled to their native countries 
in breach of Article 3. In both cases, it was held that no evi-
dence existed that Greece returned asylum seekers to Iran 
and Afghanistan. It was open to the Appellants to apply 
to the European Court for a Rule 39 indication28 against 
Greece once they were back in that country.
Accreditation
In 2007, in order to ensure that legal advice met the high-
est of standards—the sector has long been blighted by 
disreputable lawyers and so-called consultants—the gov-
ernment introduced an accreditation scheme for everyone 
providing publicly funded immigration services. There is 
certainly a feeling amongst immigration lawyers that they 
have been singled out by government. Indeed, no other area 
of the law has had an accreditation requirement imposed 
upon it. Moreover, many experienced lawyers I have spoken 
to do not believe that accreditation has been particularly 
efficacious. They point out that it does not appear to have 
curtailed unscrupulous legal aid practitioners, as after all, 
shoddy work is more a result of negligence than it is of ignor-
ance. There is also a strong feeling that the scheme ought to 
have been extended to the private, i.e. non-legal aid, sector.
The Backlog-Amnesty Issue
By 2000, it was reported that there was a backlog of some 
100,000 undecided asylum applications. This was believed to 
have risen to a staggering 450,000 cases by 2006. For at least 
twenty years, both Tory and Labour governments, whilst 
refusing to utter the politically sensitive word “amnesty,” 
have engaged in backlog reduction by administrative 
means. The tools at their disposal have included significant 
increases in discretionary grants of ELR, concessionary 
“statue of limitation” policies such as the fourteen-year rule 
which allows those who have been living in the UK illegally 
for fourteen years to remain indefinitely, and other one-
off initiatives. For example, in 1998, Labour allowed up to 
30,000 asylum seekers who had been waiting several years 
for a decision on their applications to stay and, in 2003, it 
allowed 15,000 families who had waited more than three 
years for a decision to remain.
In 2008, the government announced that it had con-
sidered around a third of the 450,000 so-called “legacy” 
cases and had awarded some 40 per cent of them Leave to 
Remain. The right-wing press and conservative pressure 
groups rail against the grant of unjustified amnesty whilst 
politicians with a more enlightened view, such as the coali-
tion government’s deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, talk 
about a route to citizenship for those who have been resi-
dent in the UK for ten years. London mayor Boris Johnson 
has even advocated a five-year-long residence concession.
Coalition Policies
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
has pledged to introduce a cap on the number of non-EU 
economic migrants permitted to live and work in the UK, 
particularly skilled workers and students. It has also prom-
ised to crack down on illegal immigration and trafficking by 
setting up a Border Police Force. The Prime Minister con-
tinues to emphasize his desire to reduce annual net migra-
tion levels. As far as asylum is concerned, the government 
has pledged to look at ways of speeding up the system and 
making it more cost-effective. It has also introduced a new 
process to enforce the removal of families who have been 
refused permission to stay in the UK.
With regard to funding, in November 2010, Ken Clarke 
set out his proposals for what the Guardian newspaper has 
referred to as the most drastic cuts to legal aid in its sixty-
year history. Routine immigration matters such as entry 
clearance applications and the grant or variation of Leave 
to Remain will no longer be funded, neither will advice on 
asylum welfare matters, and lawyers will have their fees 
reduced by 10 per cent.
Statistics: Applications and Decisions
In 2000, the UK received a record 76,040 asylum applica-
tions. In terms of decisions made in that year, 10 per cent of 
applicants were granted Refugee Status and a further 12 per 
cent were granted ELR. By 2009, the number of applications 
had fallen significantly to 24,250. Decision-wise, 27 per cent 
of applicants were allowed to remain in the UK.
This century, Europe-wide, the UK has tended to be 
ranked in and around tenth position in terms of the num-
ber of asylum seekers it has in relation to its population. 
However, in relation to France, Germany, and Italy, the 
three other countries with the largest populations, the UK 
has a higher figure, both in absolute and per capita terms.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, it appears to be very much a case of “plus ca 
change c’est la même chose” under the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government: more cuts, more detention, 
more deportations, more poor quality Home Office deci-
sion making, more lawyers forced out of the sector, and less 
access to justice for asylum seekers and other immigrants. 
The principal counterweight to this continued dogmatism 
on the part of government remains the enlightened minds 
within the upper echelons of the British judiciary.
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